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Dronenburg v. Zech: Judicial Restraint or
Judicial Prejudice?
In recent years, some courts have concluded that the constitu-
tional rights of privacy and equal protection unequivocally protect
homosexual conduct between consenting adults.' Other court opin-
ions, however, have relied on the traditional legal and social con-
demnation of homosexuality to deny protection to homosexual
conduct, especially by members of the military.2 In Dronenburg v.
Zech,3 for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
rejected privacy and equal protection challenges to a Navy regula-
tion prohibiting homosexual conduct, including private consensual
activity. Judge Bork, writing the opinion of the panel designated to
hear the case, 4 refused to find a right of privacy in private homosex-
ual conduct between consenting adults, and upheld the challenged
Navy regulation as bearing a rational relationship to legitimate gov-
ernmental interests.
This Comment challenges the Dronenburg panel's analysis of the
equal protection issues raised by the case: first, because the panel
1. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982)(invalidating statute proscrib-
ing intercourse between individuals of the same sex); People v. Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d
936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 4677 (1984)(in-
validating statute proscribing loitering in public for purposes of soliciting "deviate"
sexual conduct, including conduct in private, since statute did not require conduct pro-
scribed to be in some way offensive or annoying to others); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y. 2d
476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981)(striking
down statute proscribing consensual sodomy between homosexuals and between heter-
osexuals). As used in this Comment, a homosexual is defined as a person whose sexual
orientation is toward members of the same sex. The term "homosexual" is also used to
describe the orientation itself. The term "open homosexuals" is used in this Comment
to refer to those homosexuals who publicly acknowledge their sexuality; the term "active
homosexuals" refers to those homosexuals who are currently participating in homosex-
ual activity. The term "gay" is used interchangeably with the term "homosexual" to
refer to both male and female homosexuals.
2. The most recent cases concerning homosexual activity in the military deny a right
to homosexual conduct. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir.)(Dronenburg I),
reh'g denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(Dronenburg II); Rich v. Secretary of the Army,
735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984)(concealment of sexual orientation constituted fraudu-
lent entry that required discharge). But see Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216, Slip Op. (D.
Me. Apr. 3, 1984)(available on LEXIS)(homosexual orientation without proof of homo-
sexual conduct not grounds for exclusion from R.O.T.C.)(following benShalom v. Sec-
retary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980)).
3. Dronenburg I, 741 F.2d 1388.
4. The Dronenburg I case was heard before a panel composed of only two judges of
the D.C. Circuit, Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia. The third judge, David W. Williams
of the Central District of California, sat by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d).
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erroneously finds a rational nexus between the regulation and legiti-
mate government purposes and, second, because the panel applies
the rational basis test when a strict scrutiny analysis would be more
appropriate. A more thorough analysis of the application of
Supreme Court doctrine to the case at hand would suggest the need
for strict scrutiny either because homosexuals are a class of individ-
uals entitled to special protection against discrimination or because
homosexual conduct is immune from governmental regulation
under the right to privacy doctrine. Thus, the primary focus of the
opinion-that equal protection and the right of privacy do not pro-
tect homosexual conduct-arbitrarily and wrongly denies the funda-
mental rights of homosexuals. 5
I. Equal Protection Under the Rational Relationship Analysis
In Dronenburg v. Zech, the appellant, James L. Dronenburg, chal-
lenged a Navy regulation requiring dismissal of persons engaging in
homosexual activity.6 Dronenburg, a petty officer who had been
honorably discharged for committing homosexual acts with a sea-
man recruit in Navy barracks, 7 argued that the regulation violated
equal protection of the laws and should be subjected to strict scru-
tiny analysis. This level of scrutiny would require the Navy to jus-
5. This Comment does not evaluate the merits of Bork's formulation of the concept
ofjudicial restraint but rather attempts to show that the panel's conclusions are indefen-
sible under either a restrained or activist approach. The philosophy ofjudicial restraint
requires that courts decide cases through neutral principles and not through arbitrary
value choices. Bork believes that this concept of neutral principles mandates that issues
of governance be left to majoritarian decisionmaking except where special protections
have been either expressly marked out by the Constitution or implicated by the govern-
mental process established by the Constitution. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1 (197 1)[hereinafter cited as Bork, Neutral Principles]. As
this Comment will explain, Judge Bork completely violates the concept of neutral princi-
ples, even under an attitude of restraint, by using inaccurate stereotypes to justify the
rationality of the regulation. Moreover, although an academic may be free to discard
eighty years of Supreme Court substantive due process doctrine, see Bork, Neutral Princi-
ples, at 11 (dismissing substantive due process reasoning beginning with Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)), as a member of the lower federal judiciary, Judge Bork is
obliged to apply well-established Supreme Court doctrine even when such doctrine is
inconsistent with his personal views.
6. The Navy regulation violated by Dronenburg provided that "Any member who
solicits, attempts, or engages in homosexual acts shall be normally separated from the
naval services. The presence of such a member in a military environment impairs com-
bat readiness, efficiency, security and morale." SEC/NAV Instruction 1900.9C (Jan. 20,
1978), quoted in Dronenburg 1, 741 F.2d at 1389.
7. Dronenburg I, 741 F.2d at 1389. The panel opinion does not clearly state whether
the acts committed were both private and consensual. Thus, despite Judge Bork's elab-
orate exposition of the privacy doctrine, it is not wholly clear whether appellant
Dronenburg had standing to raise privacy claims. This Comment, however, will assume




tify its policy as a well-tailored means of promoting a compelling
state interest. The D.C. Circuit rejected this position, holding that
strict scrutiny applies only if a fundamental right has been in-
fringed. 8 After a long exegesis narrowly construing the Supreme
Court's privacy decisions,9 the panel concluded that no fundamental
right to engage in homosexual conduct exists.' 0 Consequently, the
Navy need only satisfy the less rigorous rational basis test by estab-
lishing that the regulation bears a rational relationship to a permis-
sible end. 1 I
In a few brief concluding paragraphs, Judge Bork purports to find
the rational relationship in the military's independent authority to
"implement morality" among troops.' 2 This Comment will leave
8. Dronenburg 1, 741 F.2d at 1391. Strict scrutiny protection, however, is required
both when fundamental rights are burdened, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942)(statute authorizing sterilization of criminals unconstitutionally infringed upon
right to procreate), and when a suspect class is discriminated against, United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)(dictum treating with suspicion
all public actions tending to burden "discrete and insular" minorities). Bork does not
address the argument that under the Supreme Court's established methodology for the
determination of a suspect class, homosexuals should be treated as a suspect class and
should therefore receive strict scrutiny protection. See infra text accompanying notes 33-
48.
9. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(establishing the right of privacy
doctrine and defining the right of privacy to include the right of the married couple to
use contraceptives); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)(miscegenation statute uncon-
stitutionally infringed right to marry); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (right to privacy
includes right to possess obscene materials in the privacy of the home); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)(right of unmarried adults to receive contraceptives); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(anti-abortion statute violating right to decide whether to
terminate pregnancy); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678
(1977)(right of minors to receive contraceptives).
10. Dronenburg 1, 741 F.2d at 1391-97. This Comment challenges Bork's conclusions
on the privacy question, infra text accompanying notes 52-75.
11. Dronenburg 1, 741 F.2d at 1392. Despite a general inclination of deference to the
accuracy or correctness of legislative decisionmaking, see, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981)(upholding law banning sale of milk in plastic
containers: ". . States are not required to convince the courts of the correctness of
their legislative judgments .. "), the Supreme Court has on several occasions em-
ployed the rational basis test to invalidate laws which were "not only 'imprecise,' " but
"wholly without any rational basis." Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 538 (1973)(invalidating food stamp program that denied relief to unrelated per-
sons). The Supreme Court defines the burden of the party challenging the rationality of
a law as follows: "[T]hose challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court
that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reason-
ably be conceived to be true by the government decisionmaker." Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93, 111 (1979)(upholding federal law requiring Foreign Service personnel to retire
at age 60). Given that courts have expressed hesitancy in recognizing the fundamental
rights of homosexuals in the contexts of suspect classification and privacy, discussed
infra, this Comment presents the rationality analysis as the least politically controversial
means for courts to reject the Dronenburg conclusion, although ideally greater scrutiny
should be constitutionally required.
12. Dronenburg 1, 741 F.2d at 1392.
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aside the difficulties in circumscribing such a vague, unqualified au-
thority, for the panel does not rest its holding exclusively on this
basis.' 3 The panel instead finds that the regulation bears a rational
relationship to the Navy's interest in morale and discipline, because
homosexual relationships in the military are likely:
[T]o call into question the evenhandedness of superiors' dealings with
lower ranks, to make personal dealings uncomfortable where the rela-
tionship is sexually ambiguous, to generate dislike and disapproval
among many who find homosexuality morally offensive, and, it must
be said, given the power of military superiors over their inferiors, to
enhance the possibility of homosexual seduction. 14
The shallow analysis offered by Judge Bork in finding a rational
basis for the regulation illustrates how Judge Bork approaches the
question in a decidedly partial manner. "To ask the question," de-
clares Bork, "is to answer it.' t 5 The Navy is not required to produce
any social science data or other proof to support its allegation that
homosexual conduct is harmful to military interests. Instead, Judge
Bork blindly accepts unproven generalizations about homosexuality
and finds support for the regulation in what he terms "common
sense and experience."' 6 By failing to require the Navy to prove
even a minimal connection between the regulation and a valid mili-
tary purpose, and by accepting assertions reflecting intolerance and
stereotyping more than fact, Dronenburg was foreclosed from even
disputing the alleged rational basis that the Navy proffered for the
regulation. 17 Although courts often defer to the judgment of the
13. Even assuming that the legislature has the power to "implement morality" in
civilian society, it is unclear, as Bork realizes, whether the military, as a non-elected arm
of the executive, has the right to independently legislate its own morality. Note that
Instruction 1900.9C diverges significantly from the Congressional prohibition of sod-
omy in the military under 10 U.S.C. §925 (1983) both by focusing on all homosexual
activity whether or not sodomy is involved and by not addressing heterosexual sodomy.
14. Dronenburg I, 741 F.2d at 1398.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Compare McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809 (D.Minn. 1970), rev'd, 451
F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971)(state university reneging on appointment of homosexual
librarian):
An [sic] homosexual is after all a human being, and a citizen of the United
States. . . . He is as much entitled to the protection and benefit of the laws, and
due process fair treatment as are others, at least as to public employment in the
absence of proof and not mere surmise. . . that his employment efficiency is im-
paired by his homosexuality.
316 F. Supp. at 814. In the federal civilian workplace, discharge based solely on homo-
sexual status has been held unconstitutional; to establish a rational nexus, there must be
proof that the discharge will promote the agency's efficiency. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d




military,' 8 the Dronenburg opinion goes one step beyond-avoiding
any meaningful judicial review in favor of accepting unproven and
unprovable assertions.
A more comprehensive analysis reveals little basis in fact for any
of the alleged dangers posed by homosexuals in the military. First,
the Navy's contention that the presence in the military of a person
who engages in homosexual conduct impairs combat readiness, effi-
ciency and morale' 9 is highly debatable, for there is nothing inher-
ent in homosexuality that has been shown to affect an individual's
efficiency, combat readiness or morale. If homosexual acts affected a
person's military competence, it would seem that he or she would be
easily detected and removed. Yet, empirical studies of homosexuals
in the military suggest not only that most homosexuals (75 to 80
percent) remain undetected, but also that many complete their
terms successfully, often as officers.20
The Navy, perhaps recognizing that empirical studies contradict
its view of homosexuals as unfit for military service, focuses its argu-
ments not on homosexuality per se but on its effect upon those heter-
osexuals who are offended by homosexuality. 2' Yet, even if
widespread anti-homosexual sentiment could be shown to impair
the functioning of the military, the Navy's regulation remains irra-
tional because it aims at the wrong group. The problem would be
attributable more directly not to homosexuals themselves but to
heterosexuals who oppose integration. Moreover, the intolerance
18. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)("[T]he military is, by necessity,
a specialized society separate from civilian society.").
19. Dronenburgl, 741 F.2d at 1389.
20. C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MILITARY: A STUDY OF LESS
THAN HONORABLE DISCHARGES 60 (1971). Although Williams and Weinberg found that
the risk of being detected increases as frequency of sexual activity increases, many mili-
tary personnel were nonetheless able to engage in homosexual activity without being
discovered. Id. at 178.
Although the regulation still speaks of security, it is not clear whether the military still
argues that homosexuals are a security risk. See Berg v. Claytor, 436 F. Supp. 76, 80
(D.D.C. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 591 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(military no longer
argues that homosexuals impair security); Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216, slip op., at
n.12. The argument formerly was that homosexuals were a security risk because they
were vulnerable to blackmail. Obviously, this argument is not valid with respect to open
homosexuals. Moreover, with regard to both open and "closet" homosexuals, the regu-
lation is irrational because the fear of discharge under the regulation increases the risk
of blackmail. Thus, the regulation itself is a source of the evil sought to be prevented. See
McKeand v. Laird, 490 F.2d 1262, 1266 (9th Cir. 1973)(Peckham, J., dissenting from
denial of security clearance on grounds of plaintiff's homosexuality: "[T]he Department
of Defense can easily cure the danger to national security allegedly posed by all homo-
sexuals. It can abandon its arbitrary system of revoking security clearances solely on the
findings of homosexuality and, thus, end homosexuals' fear that public exposure will
cost them their security classifications.").
21. Dronenburg I, 741 F.2d at 1398.
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rationale-that the military can exclude unpopular groups on
grounds of the feared reactions of other military personnel-has al-
ready been rejected on previous occasions. A recent case discussing
the Army's exclusionary policy toward homosexuals comments:
[T]he Army's defense of its policy is based solely upon heterosexuals'
reactions when they learn that a soldier like Matthews has a desire or
intent to engage in homosexual conduct. If the question were the pro-
priety of excuding black soldiers because of the feared reactions of
whites - an argument raised by the Army in resisting desegregation
. . .the answer clearly would be that blacks must be admitted and the
Army must through discipline and education control the reaction
. . . . Although the analogy is imperfect (constitutionally, race is a
suspect classification; and race, unlike desire or intent, cannot be sup-
pressed), the military interests here are comparable: to avoid disrup-
tive reactions. 22
Thus, to justify homosexuals' exclusion on the basis of heterosexu-
als' aversion to them is not only illogical but also fundamentally
offensive to the notion of equal protection; intolerance has never
been a permissible basis for disparate treatment.23
Even if the Navy regulation is concerned more with disapproval of
22. Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216, slip op., at text accompanying n.41; see also Saal
v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 201 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd sub nom Belier v. Mid-
dendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom, Miller v. Weinberger, 454 U.S.
855 (1981)(Navy regulation excluding homosexuals held unconstitutionally arbitrary
and capricious); Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80, 88 (9th Cir. 1981)(Boocheever, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing of Beller v. Middendorf). The military advances several
other arguments that simply reiterate the intolerance rationale and are therefore simi-
larly unacceptable. The military suggests that homosexual officers will not be able to
gain the respect or trust of their inferiors; this variation of the disapproval theme was
also once used against blacks and women. See, e.g., Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. at
201 n. 10. The military is also concerned that parents will not let their children join the
armed forces for fear of having them 6xposed to homosexuals; however, it is debatable
both that parents control the enlistment decision and that the military should shield
recruits from the reality of homosexuality.
23. See Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d at 89. The argument that homosexuals should
be excluded on the grounds that they impair military efficiency because they "tend to
become. . .victims of physical assaults," Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216, slip op., at
text accompanying n.15, is antithetical to the constitutional obligation to protect op-
pressed classes. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958) (state officials required to
desegregate schools despite claims that desegregation would lead to racial tension);
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917)(invalidating zoning ordinance requiring
racially segregated neighborhoods: "It is urged that this proposal will promote the pub-
lic peace by preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is, and important as is the preser-
vation of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which
deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution."). See also L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 944-46 (1978)(arguing that homosexuals cannot be denied
protection "simply by virtue of the group's long history of disapproval; any such doc-
trine would turn on its head the axiom of heightened judicial solicitude for despised
groups and their characteristic activities."). See also Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d at 88
(Boocheever,J., dissenting: "Intolerance is not a constitutional basis for an infringement




homosexual acts than with homosexuals themselves, it still seems
particularly improper to protect heterosexuals' intolerance when
the acts of which they complain are conducted in private. Moreover,
given the fact that most homosexual activity in the military is likely
to be undetected, 24 the removal of a few known homosexuals does
not solve the adverse effects of anti-homosexual sentiment. Those
who are most disapproving of homosexuality may suspect that addi-
tional activity is going undiscovered. The regulation, if it has any
effect, may well impair military efficiency and morale by encourag-
ing military personnel to spy on and to gossip about one another.
The rationale that homosexuals must be excluded from the mili-
tary because they inspire "dislike and disapproval" among some
heterosexuals may also be self-sustaining. Excluding homosexuals
from the military prevents them from setting an example contrary to
accepted stereotypes. The intolerance that Judge Bork employs to
justify government regulation in Dronenburg thus may be perpetu-
ated by the regulation itself.2 5
The Dronenburg opinion also finds a rational purpose for the regu-
lation by suggesting that the presence of homosexuals in the mili-
tary would lead to "sexually ambiguous relationships" that would
make personal dealings uncomfortable. Yet, the opinion does not
explain why homosexual attractions are inherently any more ambig-
uous than the heterosexual attractions that are currently tolerated. 26
If the military wishes to discourage all sexually ambiguous relation-
ships, then a regulation proscribing homosexual conduct responds
to only a small portion of the problem. Also, even if homosexual
root of each of the dangers which the Navy asserts is posed to its interests by
homosexuals.").
24. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
25. Homosexuals who are open and therefore more likely to defend their homosex-
ual orientation appear to be the primary targets of the military's exclusionary policy. See
Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216, slip op., at text accompanying nn.17 & 18 (Army offi-
cials testifying that the Army seeks to prevent homosexuals from revealing their
orientation).
26. Dronenburg 1, 741 F.2d at 1398. The military sometimes asserts that the abiguity
problem is exacerbated by the fact that military personnel of the same sex must often
live in close confinement. See Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d at 812. Yet, there is no
reason to think that sexual attractions are any different in close quarters than in less
crowded conditions. Also, if the military is alluding to heterosexuals' fear of being close
to homosexuals, then the military is simply reiterating the unacceptable intolerance ra-
tionale. If military personnnel fear unwilling exposure to sexual acts in close quarters,
such fear is unwarranted because such sexual behavior, not being conducted in private,
is not protected under the right to privacy. Such non-private homosexual activity can
therefore be regulated in the same manner as public displays of heterosexual activity. If
military personnel fear being raped or otherwise sexually harassed, such a problem can
be addressed by proscribing rape without distinguishing homosexual rape from hetero-
sexual rape.
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encounters were uniquely ambiguous, the effect of a regulation that
excludes open homosexuals but not latent homosexuals would be to
exclude the sexually unambiguous. A heterosexual might experience
more confusion in dealing with a repressed homosexual than with a
person whose sexual preferences were known to both parties.
In his opinion, Judge Bork also suggests that the military can ex-
clude active homosexuals in order to prevent the homosexual se-
duction of military personnel by their commanding officers.2 7 If
Bork uses the term "homosexual seduction" to mean non-consen-
sual activity, the regulation is unnecessary because coerced sexual
activity is already illegal in both the military and civilian sectors.28
More importantly, given the presence of women in the military, a
prohibition against homosexual seduction but not heterosexual se-
duction addresses only part of the dangers of sexual harassment.
Additionally, the opinion alludes to the possibility of favoritism by
a commanding officer toward a subordinate with whom he or she is
having an affair.2 9 The regulation, however, is an irrational solution
to this problem because there is no reason to treat homosexual fa-
voritism any differently than heterosexual favoritism. Yet, when het-
erosexual relationships impair the evenhandedness of superiors'
dealings with their inferiors, the problems are approached on a
case-by-case basis.30 Thus, the regulation is superfluous because
there already is a system for dealing more directly and precisely
with the problem of sexual favoritism.
The approach of the Bork opinion is decidedly "non-neutral."
The finding of a rational relationship between the Navy regulation
and a permissible government purpose depends on a biased and
limited understanding of homosexuality. Viewed in "neutral"
terms-i.e. terms not different from those reserved for heterosexual
activity-homosexuality poses no greater threat to military morale
27. Dronenburg I, 741 F.2d at 1398.
28. Rape is prohibited under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §920
(1983); however, rape is currently defined only with reference to female victims, homo-
sexual rape being punishable under the sodomy provision.
29. If Bork is referring not to coerced "seduction" but to non-coerced "seduction,"
then he is simply reiterating the rationale that consensual homosexual activity should be
prohibited on "moral" grounds. The moral justification is criticized infra at text accom-
panying notes 70-75.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Johanns, 17 M.J. 862, 868 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983)(adverse
effect of officer's heterosexual activity with unmarried enlisted persons evaluated in light
of "surrounding circumstances"); see also Dronenburg 11, 746 F.2d at 1579 (Robinson, J.,
dissenting to denial of rehearing: "In effect, the navy presumes that any homosexual
conduct constitutes cause for discharge but it treats heterosexual relations on a case-by-




or troop readiness than heterosexual activity. 3' Judicial prejudice is
thus central to the holding in Dronenburg that the challenged Navy
regulation meets even a minimal threshhold of rationality. 32
II. Strict Scrutiny Under the Suspect Class Approach
In addition to failing to establish a rational basis for the regula-
tion, the Dronenburg opinion errs in a more fundamental way by fail-
ing to recognize that the regulation invidiously discriminates against
a group possessing all the characteristics of a suspect class. As such,
the Navy regulation should be upheld only if it is the least restrictive
means of promoting a compelling state interest. Judge Bork ac-
knowledges that the "strict scrutiny" analysis is required where ac-
tions impinge on suspect classes such as racial minorities 33 and that
lower court judges can turn to the established methodology of the
Supreme Court to determine the scope of constitutional rights. 34
Yet, in the Dronenburg opinion, he does not even consider the possi-
bility that homosexuals may be a suspect class entitled to strict scru-
tiny protection.3 5
31. The concept of neutral principles is discussed briefly, supra note 5. In Dronenburg
H, Bork defends his non-neutral approach by asserting that the military can treat homo-
sexuals and heterosexuals as classes which are "morally" different:
We cannot take seriously the dissent's suggestion that the Navy may constitutionally
be required to treat heterosexual conduct and homosexual conduct as either mor-
ally equivalent or as posing equal dangers to the Navy's mission. Relativism in these
matters may or may not be an arguable moral stance, a point that we as a court of
appeals are not required to address, but moral relativism is hardly a constitutional
command, nor is it, we are certain, the moral stance of a large majority of naval
personnel.
Dronenburg H, 746 F.2d at 1582. Yet, even if the state is allowed to regulate sexual behav-
ior, and even if the military is allowed to enforce its independent "moral stance" with
regard to the propriety of particular sexual behavior, Judge Bork's statement is unac-
ceptable because it eradicates the very foundations of equal protection; what Bork sug-
gests is that the Constitution allows a majority to deny even the lowest-level equal
protection scrutiny to any class that the majority "abhors." Thus, once again Bork re-
turns to intolerance as a basis for abandoning any meaningful judicial review.
32. The Navy regulation is not only an irrational answer to the problems perceived
by Judge Bork, it may also do the military a disservice by preventing it from attracting
and retaining qualified and dedicated people. Dronenburg, for example, had earned
many citations praising his performance before his private homosexual activities were
discovered. Dronenburg 1, 741 F.2d at 1389.
33. Dronenburg 1, 741 F.2d at 1397.
34. Dronenburg 1, 741 F.2d at 1395.
35. The Dronenburg opinion is not the only decision to refrain from treating homo-
sexuals as a suspect class; in fact, most courts have denied homosexuals suspect class
treatment. Yet, none of these decisions has actually analyzed the applicability of suspect
class criteria to homosexuals. See Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d at 1229; Na-
tional Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 1984)prob.juris.
noted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3235 (1984), ajfd, 53 U.S.L.W. -, No. 83-2030 (March 26, 1985)
(declaring unconstitutional statute permitting teacher to be fired for engaging in public
homosexual conduct because statute regulated free speech); Hatheway v. Secretary of
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In defining a suspect class, the Supreme Court has established
several requirements:3 6 1) that the group in question must have suf-
fered a long history of discrimination; 37 2) that the group must be
defined by a trait not related to the ability to perform in and contrib-
ute to society;38 3) that the group must be visibly identifiable; 39
4) that the group must be politically powerless; 40 and 5) that the
trait characterizing the group be inherent or immutable.4' Each of
the characteristics, it can be argued, is applicable to homosexuals.
Homosexuals have suffered a long history of discrimination in
Western society. This intolerance dates back at least to the Old Tes-
tament and spread through European civilization with the rise of the
Christian church.42 In addition, homosexuality is a characteristic
unrelated to job performance. 43 Thus, the first two requirements
are easily met. As to the requirement that the group be easily identi-
fiable, although most gays cannot be distinguished at a glance, an
open homosexual who participates in gay social, political and reli-
gious activities or who publicly acknowledges his or her homosexu-
ality may indeed be "visible" within the local community. 44 With
the Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1382 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1982)(uphold-
ing discharge for homosexual conduct against privacy and equal protection challenges);
DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir,
1979) (homosexuals not a class within meaning of Title VII's prohibition of discrimina-
tion based on gender). But see Rowland v. Mad River Loc. School Dist., 53 U.S.L.W.
3614, 3615 (Feb. 25, 1985) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari in case involving bisexual teacher, suggesting that homosexuals are a suspect class).
L. TRIBE, supra note 23, at 944 n.17 (arguing that homosexuals satisfy suspect class
criteria).
36. This analysis is based on the list of requirements presented in Note, Homosexuals'
Right to Many: A Constitutional Test and a Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 202-03
(1979).
37. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973), reh'g denied, 411
U.S. 959 (1973)(state public school financing scheme based on property taxation did
not discriminate against any definable suspect class); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 684 (1973)(plurality opinion invalidating statute treating men and women in the
armed forces differently with regard to the ability to claim a spouse as a dependant). The
strict scrutiny treatment for women adopted in Frontiero was later abandoned, and an
intermediate level of scrutiny was applied instead. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(invalidating statute prohibiting sale of beer to males less than 21 years of age and to
females less than 18 years of age).
38. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684.
39. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
40. San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 28.
41. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (citing Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164, 175 (1972) (invalidating workmen's compensation statute discriminating against il-
legitimates: "legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.")
42. W. CHURCHILL, HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR AMONG MALES 199-209 (1967); Note,
The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613,
1627 (1974); Note, Homosexuals' Right to Marry, supra note 36, at 203.
43. Tribe, supra note 19, at 944 n.17.




regard to the requirement of political powerlessness, the inability of
homosexuals to achieve recognition in the legislatures is evidenced
by the fact that 24 states still retain laws criminalizing homosexual
conduct. 45 Moreover, gays continue to face numerous other legal
and social inequities that both attest to and perpetuate the
powerlessness of the gay population. 46  Finally, homosexuality,
while not necessarily determined at birth, is usually determined at
an early age; it is thus not a conscious choice of an individual, and
in that sense is an inherent characteristic. 47 In addition, sexual ori-
entation, once realized by an adult homosexual, is unlikely to
change, having already become an integral part of that individual's
personality.48 In each circumstance, courts should recognize the
should also be included in the protected class of homosexuals because in many cases a
latent homosexual's true sexual orientation may be suspected or even known by others
regardless of his or her desire to remain undetected. Even if many latent homosexuals
are not visible, such invisibility does not preclude their inclusion in the protected class
of homosexuals because visible traits are not an absolute requirement for a suspect
class; nationality, for instance, is suspect but not visible. See Chaitin and Lefcourt, Is Gay
Suspect?, 8 LINCOLN L. REV. 24, 43 (1973); Note, Homosexuals' Right to Marry, supra note
36, at 204. Furthermore, visibility seems to be a questionable requirement for protection
given the fact that homosexuals are often invisible because they are hiding their orienta-
tion in order to avoid discrimination. Thus, requiring visibility seems illogical because
lack of visibility stems in part from the need for protection. SeeJ. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 163 (1980)("It is therefore a combination of prejudice and hideability that
renders classifications that disadvantage homosexuals suspicious.").
45. Williams, After Uplinger, LAMBDA UPDATE, Sept. 1984, at 5. Accord, Rowland, 53
U.S.L.W. 3614, 3615 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari:
"Because of the immediate and severe opprobrium often manifested against homosexu-
als once so identified publicly, members of the group are politically powerless to pursue
their rights in the political arena.").
46. Note, Homosexuals' Right to Marry, supra note 36, at 198-99, 204-05. An in-depth
treatment of gay legal problems appears in Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal
Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L. J. 799 (1979).
47. Churchill, supra note 42, at 260-91; Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding
Private Homosexual Conduct, supra note 42, at 1626; L. TRIBE, supra note 23, at 944 n.17
(most scientists concluding that homosexuality is either determined before birth or in
early childhood).
48. Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, supra note
42, at 1626 (citing D. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY 266 (1968) and W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREE-
DOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 227 (1973)). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 23, at 944 n.17
(even scientists who do not view homosexuality as immutable admit that orientation can-
not be changed in all cases). Some commentators argue that homosexuals should re-
ceive intermediate level scrutiny. See, e.g., Note, Homosexuals'Right to Marry, supra note 36,
at 206. This Comment argues, however, that homosexuals are more like suspect racial
classes than intermediate level classes such as women because homosexuals have a his-
tory of social ostracism, scorn, ridicule, and violent treatment. This treatment is more
characteristic of oppressed races than of intermediate-level groups such as women, who
also face inequity and occasional violence but have always been treated with some de-
gree of cultural acceptance. Even if courts conclude that homosexuals do not fully satisfy
all of the suspect criteria, homosexuals' history of brutal mistreatment certainly suggests
that homosexuals deserve far more than rational basis protection. See, e.g., Rowland, 53
U.S.L.W. 3614, 3615 (1985) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certi-
orari: "[H]omosexuals have historically been the object of pernicious and sustained
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status of homosexuals as a suspect class in need of strict scrutiny
protection.
The application of a heightened level of scrutiny illustrates how
the regulation operates to exclude homosexuals on the basis of their
status rather than on the basis of their effects on military interests.
The regulation is not narrowly tailored to the problems alleged by
the military because it proscribes all homosexual conduct, whether
relevant to military interests or not. For example, the prohibition
seeks to prevent coerced seduction by prohibiting both consensual
and nonconsensual homosexual activity rather than only the latter.
Similarly, the regulation attempts to combat the problem of favorit-
ism by proscribing all homosexual relationships, not just relation-
ships between officers and persons under their command. The
regulation is also overly broad because it proscribes homosexual
conduct under every circumstance, including activities conducted
off duty, off base and with civilians. 49 By requiring homosexuals,
but not heterosexuals, to be virtually celibate throughout their mili-
tary careers, the regulation acts upon homosexuals as a class rather
than against particular situations in which sexual activity, heterosex-
ual as well as homosexual, may be harmful to military interests.
Finally, the military's policy of excluding homosexuals, when
viewed in its entirety, suggests more clearly that the Navy regulation
is part of a larger plan to discriminate solely on the basis of homo-
sexual status. The fact that the armed forces attempt to deny admis-
sion to all open homosexuals, including those who promise not to
engage in sexual activity, 50 demonstrates that the military is more
concerned with excluding an unpopular class than with prohibiting
allegedly deleterious acts. 5 1 Thus, the regulation, viewed both inde-
pendently and as part of a larger pattern of invidious discrimination
on the basis of homosexual status, should be struck down.
hostility, and it is fair to say that discrimination against homosexuals is likely . .. to
reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than .. .rationality.") (citation omitted).
49. See United States v. Newak, 15 MJ. 541 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982)(dismissal under a
regulation similar to the Navy's regulation for consensual off-base lesbian acts).
50. C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, supra note 20, at 24; see, e.g., Rich v. Secretary of
the Army, 735 F.2d at 1224-25 (Army requiring upon enlistment a denial of past homo-
sexual activity). Cf Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216, Slip Op., at text accompanying n.4;
benShalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
51. Other evidence of status discrimination includes SEC/NAV Instruction 1900.9C
6b (Jan. 20, 1978), which excuses isolated homosexual incidents provided that the
accused does not "profess or demonstrate proclivity to repeat such act", quoted in
Dronenburg 1, 741 F.2d at 1389 (emphasis added). Also recall that SEC/NAV Instruction




III. Strict Scrutiny Under The Right of Privacy Analysis
Dronenburg's second argument for strict scrutiny was based on
the claim that the regulation infringed his constitutional right of pri-
vacy. He argued that the right of privacy doctrine as developed by
the Supreme Court encompasses homosexual conduct under the
principle that "the government should not interfere with an individ-
ual's freedom to control intimate personal decisions regarding his
or her own body." 52
The Dronenburg panel holds instead that none of the Supreme
Court's privacy decisions have "defined the right so broadly as to
encompass homosexual conduct" and that several justices have ex-
pressly rejected the inclusion of homosexual conduct within the
right of privacy. 53 The court cites Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for
Richmond,54 in which the Supreme Court summarily affirmed without
opinion a district court decision concluding that the right of privacy
does not extend to homosexual conduct. Doe involved a pre-enforce-
ment challenge to a state anti-sodomy statute that, like the Navy reg-
ulation, prohibited homosexual conduct between consenting adults
even in private.
Reliance on Doe, however, may be misplaced. Doe has been subse-
quently interpreted by several courts as an ambiguous precedent be-
cause it is not clear whether the Supreme Court adopted the lower
court's privacy reasoning or only affirmed its suggestion that the pe-
titioners lacked standing as representatives in a class action pre-en-
forcement challenge.5 5 Even leaving aside its uncertain precedential
value, the lower court holding in Doe should be rejected because it
52. Dronenburg 1, 741 F.2d at 1391. It appears that Dronenburg also challenged the
regulation on privacy grounds independent of equal protection analysis; this Comment,
however, will track the path of Bork's opinion and will consider the privacy doctrine only
as a reason for strict scrutiny. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154, the Supreme Court re-
jected in dictum the claim that "one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one
pleases"; however, Dronenburg did not assert that the right to do with one's body as
one pleases was unlimited. Dronenburg 1, 741 F.2d at 1391.
53. Dronenburg 1, 741 F.2d at 1391 (citing the dissent of Justice Harlan in Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961), reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 901 (1961)).
54. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 955 (1976).
55. For a discussion of the precedential value of Doe, see Baker v. Wade, 553 F.
Supp. at 1137-38; Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d at 84; People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936.
In Dronenburg II, Judge Robinson of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit explained
in his dissent to the denial of a rehearing of Dronenburg 1: "To hold Dronenburg's claims
hostage to a one-word summary affirmance disregards the well-established principle that
such a disposition by the Supreme Court decides the issue between the parties on the
narrowest possible grounds." Dronenburg 11, 746 F.2d at 1580. Bork responded in
Dronenburg II that Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975)(summary dismissal constituted
a decision on the merits), requires that summary affirmances be fully binding on the
lower federal courts. Dronenburg 11, 746 F.2d at 1582 n.1. Bork does not acknowledge
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mistakenly assumes that the right of privacy must be extended be-
yond existing Supreme Court precedent in order to protect homo-
sexual conduct. Judge Bork adopts this view in Dronenburg,
concluding that the lower courts have no warrant to create new
rights and thereby promulgate "judge-made constitutional law hav-
ing little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the design
of the Constitution." 56
Where Bork errs, even under a restrictive approach to the privacy
doctrine, is by adopting the questionable assertion of the district
court in Doe that homosexual conduct bears no relationship to the
traditional concerns of privacy law: marriage, home and family. 57
Doe overlooks the fact that several Supreme Court decisions have
already extended the right to privacy beyond the marital institu-
tion. 58 Furthermore, it is circular to deny homosexuals privacy pro-
tection on the grounds that they cannot marry while simultaneously
denying homosexuals legal marriage on the grounds that the right
of privacy does not extend to homosexual conduct. 59 Finally, the
assertion that homosexual activity has nothing to do with home and
family is simply incorrect. Many homosexuals enter long-term rela-
tionships60 and sometimes adopt or have their own children
through traditional methods or through artificial insemination and
surrogate mothers. 6 1 Thus, homosexual relationships are not neces-
sarily inconsistent with the traditional emphasis on home and family
life. 62 Therefore, as threshold matter, the right of privacy arguably
that the language in Carey implicitly overrules the summary affirmance in Doe. See infra
text accompanying note 71.
56. Dronenburg I, 741 F.2d at 1396 (quoting Justice White's dissent in Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977)(plurality opinion invalidating zoning ordi-
nance limiting occupancy of dwellings only to nuclear family units)).
57. 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
58. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (right to possess obscene materials in the pri-
vacy of the home); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (right of unmarried adults to re-
ceive contraceptives); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (right of
unmarried minors to receive contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (right of a
woman, whether married or not, to terminate her preganancy); see also the analysis in
Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. at 1136-41.
59. Compare Note, Homosexuals' Right to Marry, supra note 36, at 201 (arguing that
homosexuals' right to marry cannot be based in the right to privacy because the right to
privacy has not been extended to homosexuals).
60. Id. at 197-98 nn.26-27.
61. Hitchens, Donor Insemination, LAMBDA UPDATE, Sept. 1984, at 4; Rivera, supra note
46, at 906.
62. The Constitution protects family units other than the nuclear family, which con-
sists solely of a husband, wife and their children. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (invalidating zoning ordinance limiting occupancy of dwellings to nuclear fami-
lies). "[T]he Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its children-and




already encompasses homosexual relationships.
The Bork opinion also argues that the Supreme Court has pro-
vided no guidance to determine the extent of the right of privacy
beyond observing that it includes rights that are "fundamental" or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 63 According to Bork, it
is impossible to conclude that a right to homosexual conduct meets
this requirement. 64 Yet Bork's restricted view of the privacy doctrine
seems itself to be antithetical to a notion of ordered liberty. Denying
privacy protection whenever the activity involved is homosexual
means that a homosexual must transform his or her sexual prefer-
ence in order to receive the protection that the right of privacy pro-
vides for sexual intimacy; however, requiring individuals to
restructure their emotional identity seems to violate rights essential
to individual liberty, such as the right to think freely. 65 Bork simply
overlooks the argument that "ordered liberty" necessarily encom-
passes something as deeply intertwined with personal autonomy as
sexual preference and that to discriminate between heterosexual
and homosexual activity therefore violates the essence of individual
liberty by attempting to regulate personalities.
Bork's view of ordered liberty not only imperils free thinking but
506. Moore does not indicate where the line defining a family unit can constitutionally be
drawn.
63. Dronenburg I, 741 F.2d at 1396. Because Dronenburg I was heard before a panel
comprised of only two D.C. Circuit judges, it is not clear whether Bork's construction of
the privacy doctrine expresses the majority view of the court. EvenJudge Ginsburg, who
concurred with the denial of rehearing in Dronenburg II, said: "I read the opinion's ex-
tended remarks on constitutional interpretation as commentarial exposition of the opin-
ion writer's viewpoint, a personal statement that does not carry or purport to carry the
approbation of 'the court.' " Dronenburg 11, 746 F.2d at 1582. In response to Bork's ex-
planation that the Supreme Court's privacy decisions offer no guidance, Judge Robin-
son, dissenting in Dronenburg 1I, called Bork's approach a "spring cleaning" of
constitutional law. 746 F.2d at 1580.
64. Dronenburg 1, 741 F.2d at 1396.
65. Arguments linking a right to sexual privacy with personal autonomy are deserv-
ing of a more comprehensive discussion than this Comment can pursue. See, e.g., Gerety,
Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 261-81 (1977). Because homosexuals'
first amendment rights are protected by the courts, it would seem that a right to privacy
is thereby implicated. See benShalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. at 976 ("the
Army's policy of discharging people simply for having homosexual personalities also of-
fends privacy interests rooted in the First Amendment") (emphasis in original); Richard-
son v. Hampton, 345 F. Supp. 600, 608 (D.D.C. 1972) ("Courts have increasingly
recognized that an individual's private sexual preferences, activities and associations are
among those areas protected from governmental inquiry by the First Amendment.");
Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216, slip op.; Scott v. Macy, 417 F.2d at 1165 ("[Tlhe no-
tion that it could be an appropriate function of the federal bureaucracy to enforce the
majority's conventional codes of conduct in the private lives of its employees is at war
with elementary concepts of liberty, privacy, and diversity."). See also Hatheway v. Secre-
tary of the Army, 641 F.2d at 1382 (privacy concerns trigger intermediate scrutiny of
Army's exclusion of active homosexuals).
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also demotes homosexuals to a second-class status entitling them to
only a portion of the full scope of constitutional guarantees. If pri-
vacy is a constitutional right, however, then it must apply to all citi-
zens.66 Yet, this right, as it is viewed by Bork, allows the homosexual
minority nothing more than the meaningless right to engage in het-
erosexual conduct. Thus, Bork's scheme of ordered liberty allows
heterosexuals to engage in sexual activity but relegates homosexuals
to celibacy. This interpretation of ordered liberty, which arbitrarily
treats a substantial component of the population as quasi-citizens
entitled to only a lesser level of constitutional freedoms, has no
mandate in either the language or design of the Constitution.
Having found no guidance in the Supreme Court's privacy doc-
trine for protecting homosexual activities, Bork asserts that the reg-
ulation of sexual conduct is a legitimate state interest: "If the
revolution in sexual mores that appellant proclaims is in fact ever to
arrive, we think it must arrive through the moral choices of the peo-
ple and their chosen representatives, not through the ukase of this
court." 6 7 Yet a majoritarian solution to homosexual discrimination
seems patently inadequate, especially in light of the relative
powerlessness of the homosexual minority. 68 It is not clear how a
minority of an estimated 10 percent of the male population and 8
percent of the female population can achieve change within a
majoritarian system, especially on a national level. 69 The problem is
all the more serious because politicians are reluctant to adopt a
stance on gay issues, perhaps for fear of raising suspicions concern-
ing their own sexuality.
Bork's majoritarian solution also assumes that the Constitution
permits the majority to regulate private sexual behavior. This prem-
ise was undermined in Carey v. Population Services International,70 in
which the Supreme Court stated that it had not "definitively an-
swered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Consti-
66. See Rowland v. Mad River Loc. School Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3614 (Feb. 25, 1985) (Edwards,J., dissenting from decision up-
holding the suspension of a school guidance counselor for discussing her bisexual orien-
tation: "The Constitution protects all citizens of the United States; no language therein
excludes the homosexual minority.").
67. Dronenburg I, 741 F.2d at 1397.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 45 & 46.
69. The percentages refer to those persons who are exclusively or predominantly
homosexual. See P. FISHER, THE GAY MYSTIQUE 254, 256 (1978)(explaining the data re-
vealed in A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
(1948); A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN & P. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
HUMAN FEMALE (1953)(finding a spectrum of sexuality with many persons located be-
tween the homosexual and heterosexual extremes).




tution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual]
behavior among adults." 7' The state concededly has an interest in
certain arguably moral concerns, such as preventing harm to indi-
viduals and to the state.72 It is not clear, however, that any harm
results from private consensual activity. 73 Bork nonetheless analo-
gizes the public moral concerns expressed in worker safety and envi-
ronmental legislation to the concern motivating prohibitions on
homosexual conduct.74 Such an analogy is misplaced because the
former involve conflicts between actors in the public arena whereas
the latter involve private consensual activities, which by definition
involve neither conflict nor public conduct. 75 Bork's amorphous
concept of morality obscures the distinctions between the constitu-
tionally questionable regulation of private, consensual sexual activ-
ity and regulation of public concerns whose validity has already
been constitutionally established. Thus, with Carey having left the
legitimacy of "moral" legislation against homosexual conduct in
doubt, the questions raised in the Dronenburg case are ones that are
appropriately addressed by constitutional interpretation and not, as
Bork perceives, by majoritarian lawmaking.
IV. Conclusion
The Dronenburg decision offers a significant example of how some
judges rely on traditional misconceptions about homosexuality to
justify repression of nonconformist behavior. Also, the manner in
which Bork's decision confines doctrinally important Supreme
Court cases to their facts allows courts, when faced with issues in-
71. 431 U.S. at 688 n.5, 694 n.17 (brackets in original). Bork's concept of judicial
restraint apparently does not inhibit him from definitively answering in the homosexual
context the "difficult question" that the Supreme Court left open in Carey. In Dronenburg
II, Bork explained that the concept ofjudicial restraint did not prevent him from criticiz-
ing the Supreme Court privacy decisions and thereby concluding that the privacy doc-
trine provided no basis for leaving the sexual issue open with regard to homosexuals.
Judicial restraint, in Bork's view, in fact required such criticism; Bork explains: " 'Judicial
restraint' is shorthand for the philosophy that courts ought not invade the domain the
Constitution marks out for democratic rather than judicial governance." Dronenburg H,
746 F.2d at 1583. The problem with Bork's analysis here is that Carey demonstrates that
the regulation of private sexual activity has not yet been determined to be an area that
the Constitution has granted to the legislature.
72. For a more in-depth discussion of harm as an interest of the state, see Gerety,
supra note 65, at 276-81.
73. Id.
74. Dronenburg I, 741 F.2d at 1397.
75. Bork also inappropriately analogizes the moral concern in preventing consensual
private adult homosexuality to the concern for prohibiting bestiality, Dronenburg 1, 741
F.2d at 1397 n.6; however, bestiality is by definition neither between adults nor between
consenting parties.
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volving unconventional activity, to abandon their obligation to pro-
tect fundamental rights against infringement. By denying even a
minimum of equal protection, Bork's opinion in Dronenburg seriously
exacerbates the already precarious legal position of homosexuals.76
Unless courts are willing to fulfill their obligation to deliberate seri-
ously such issues when presented to them, members of the homo-
sexual minority, confronted by insensitivity to gay issues in many
legislatures as well as courts, appear to have nowhere left to turn for
recognition of their fundamental rights as autonomous individuals.
Andrew Berrien Jones
76. Because some courts refuse to protect homosexual activity, it would seem that
active homosexuals born and raised in socially and legally intolerant areas must migrate
to more tolerant areas (e.g., cities such as New York and San Francisco) in order to
establish their autonomy. It seems questionable that the people of the "land of the free"
must migrate in order to attain fundamental constitutional rights. Note that recent cases
sustaining the military's exclusionary policy, such as Dronenburg I, have already served as
the basis for two major law schools to revoke policies that had barred on-campus mili-
tary recruitment on the grounds of discrimination against homosexuals. The University
of California law schools at Los Angeles and at Berkeley (Boalt Hall) have denied that
the change was due to a threat by Major General HughJ. Clausen, the Army's judge and
advocate general, that both schools would lose valuable government contracts unless
the anti-discrimination policy was changed. President David Gardner of the University of
California explained that the university's anti-discrimination policy applied only to em-
ployment practices in violation of federal or state law; thus, since courts have upheld the
military's exclusionary policy, the law schools' policy against anti-gay recruiters no
longer applied to the Department of Defense. Kaplan, Two California Schools Lift Ban on
Visits by Anti-Gay Recruiters, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 29, 1984, at 4.
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